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The problem of device-independent randomness amplification against no-signaling ad-
versaries has so far been studied under the assumption that the weak source of random-
ness is uncorrelated with the (quantum) devices used in the amplification procedure. In
this work, we relax this assumption, and reconsider the original protocol of Colbeck and
Renner [4] on randomness amplification using a Santha-Vazirani (SV) source. To do so,
we introduce an SV-like condition for devices, namely that any string of SV source bits
remains weakly random conditioned upon any other bit string from the same SV source
and the outputs obtained when this further string is input into the devices. Assuming this
condition, we show that a quantum device using a singlet state to violate the chained Bell
inequalities leads to full randomness in the asymptotic scenario of a large number of set-
tings, for a restricted set of SV sources (with 0 ≤ ε < (2(1/12)−1)
2(2(1/12)+1)
≈ 0.0144). We also study
a device-independent protocol that allows for correlations between the sequence of boxes
used in the protocol and the SV source bits used to choose the particular box from whose
output the randomness is obtained. Assuming the SV-like condition for devices, we show
that the honest parties can achieve amplification of the weak source against this attack for
the parameter range 0 ≤ ε < 0.0132. We leave the case of a yet more general attack on the
amplification protocol as an interesting open problem.
Introduction
In many applications, like numerical simulations, cryptography or gambling, just to name
a few, free randomness is desired due to the fact that a wide range of results is based on it. In
practice, however, random sources are rarely private and only weak partially sources of random-
ness are available. That is why the problem of randomness amplification became useful and
worth investigating. Overall, the idea is to use the inputs from a partially random source and ob-
tain perfectly random output bits. In classical information theory, randomness amplification from
a single weak source is unattainable ([16]). However, it becomes possible, if the no-signaling prin-
ciple is assumed and quantum-mechanical correlations are used. Such correlations are revealed
operationally through the violation of Bell inequalities.
As a weak source to be amplified, we consider an ε-SV source (named for Santha and Vazirani
[16]), where ε is a parameter which indicates how far we are from full randomness. An ε-SV
source is given by a probability distribution P (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, . . .) over bit strings such that
(0.5− ε) ≤ P (ϕ1|e) ≤ (0.5 + ε),
(0.5− ε) ≤ P (ϕi+1|ϕ1, . . . , ϕi, e) ≤ (0.5 + ε) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
(1)
where the e represents an arbitrary random variable prior to ϕ1, which can influence
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, . . .. Note that, when ε = 0, bits are fully random, while they are fully determinis-
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2tic when ε = 0.5. For brevity, throughout the rest of the paper we will write p− for (0.5 − ε) and
p+ for (0.5 + ε).
In the research on randomness amplification, the paper of Colbeck and Renner [4] is certainly
crucial. It is also a starting point for our idea. The authors consider the bipartite scenario of the
chained Bell inequality and prove that, under certain assumptions (discussed later), it is possible
to amplify randomness of ε-SV sources, provided ε <
(√
2− 1)2 /2 ≈ 0.086. The result may be
improved, as is done in [12]. There, based on the observation that extremal points of the set of
probability distributions from an ε-SV source are certain permutations of Bernoulli distributions
with parameter (0.5 − ε), randomness amplification was obtained for any ε < 0.0961. Moreover,
the bound was shown to be tight, which means that under these assumptions, it is not possible to
achieve randomness amplification using the chained Bell inequality above this threshold.
Gallego et al. [5] show that, given an ε-SV source, with any 0 < ε < 0.5, and assuming no-
signaling, full randomness may be certified using quantum non-local correlations. In this paper,
the Bell scenario of five-party Mermin inequality is considered, however, unlike in the protocol
proposed in [4], the hashing function used to compute the final random bit is not explicitly pro-
vided and a large number of space-like separated devices is required.
Further results were obtained in [6], [8], [7], [9] etc., a wide range of protocols have been pro-
posed, these are summarized and compared in Table I in [7]. The problem has been considered
from different points of view and a lot of obstacles, such as the requirement of an infinite num-
ber of devices or no tolerance for noise, have already been overcome. However, relaxing the
assumption about independence between a source and a device has not yet been widely studied,
especially in the context of a finite device framework against a no-signaling adversary.
In this paper, we relax this assumption, i.e., do not require a source and a device to be inde-
pendent, while still considering a finite device protocol for amplification against a no-signaling
adversary. Instead, we only limit the correlations between the source and device by one con-
straint, which we call the SV-condition for boxes and specify in detail later. We prove explicitly
that the most malicious correlations (between a source and a device) are not allowed due to the
assumption that an ε-SV source remains an ε-SV source even upon obtaining the inputs and out-
puts from boxes (SV-condition for boxes). Hence, randomness amplification is still possible. Our
new method of proof allows to analyze an attack where an adversary sends to the honest parties
those boxes that are particularly adapted to their measurement settings. We explain the dangers
of such attacks with an explicit example in Section 2.
So far, only Chung et al. [8] have tried to weaken the independence assumption, however
their approach to this question explicitly requires the use of a large number of devices which
is a major drawback we desire to avoid. We therefore propose an alternative approach to the
problem. We believe that these results give a new insight into the problem and, due to the clarity
of assumptions, will also be significant in the more general task of obtaining secure key bits in
cryptography. Moreover, as we shall see, in the present paper, we also obtain randomness under
weaker assumptions than those of [8].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I we introduce some basic notations and def-
initions. A motivation for the paper is described in Section II with a toy example of an attack
strategy for the adversary. In Section III we formally state the assumptions in the paper and dis-
cuss the results for a single no-signaling box. Section IV is devoted to the explicit example of the
chained Bell inequality, which is interesting because it may be compared with the results of Col-
beck and Renner [4]. In Section V we revisit the Colbeck and Renner protocol for amplification
of randomness using the chained Bell inequality. We then prove, in Section VI, that under the
relaxed assumption, against a general symmetric attack, the protocol allows for amplification in
the parameter range 0 ≤ ε < 0.0132. The final part of the paper, in which we certify randomness
does not finalize the problem yet. Although the intuition is that we analyze the strongest possible
3attack, the symmetry assumption should formally be relaxed. The aim of further research is to
investigate whether stronger attacks than the one proposed in this paper are possible, and if so
whether a protocol can be devised to achieve amplification against these as well.
I. PRELIMINARIES
A. No-signaling boxes
In our study we use a family of probability distributions, usually called a box, denoted by
P (O|I), where I andO are random variables describing the vectors of inputs and outputs, respec-
tively.
To talk about randomness amplification, it is advisable to explain what is meant by the no-
signaling condition. In the simplest case, when there are only two parties: Alice and Bob, the
no-signaling assumption is that∑
y P (O = (x, y)|I = (u, v)) =
∑
y P (O = (x, y)|I = (u, v′)) for every u, v, v′, x,∑
x P (O = (x, y)|I = (u, v)) =
∑
x P (O = (x, y)|I = (u′, v)) for every u, u′, v, y. (2)
B. Bell values observed in laboratories
Theoretically, there may exist no-signaling boxes which attain the algebraic violation of chosen
Bell inequality. However, as for now, we are able to use in laboratories only these boxes which
violate the inequality up to the value obtained within the rules of quantum mechanics. This
simply means that the Bell value observed in a lab may not be lower (here a larger violation is
characterized by a smaller value for the Bell expression) than the value predicted by quantum
mechanics.
C. Bell inequalities useful for randomness amplification
It is well-known that quantum mechanics allows for non-local correlations between spatially
separated systems. Occurrence of such correlations can be verified through the violation of Bell
inequalities. The convex set formed by the correlations described by quantum theory is sand-
wiched between the sets of classical and general no-signaling correlations. Only extremal boxes
(vertices) of the no-signaling polytope are completely uncorrelated with the environment and
hence provide intrinsic certified randomness. It has been recently proven in [15] that non-local
vertices of the no-signaling polytopes of correlations admit no quantum realization. For amplifi-
cation of SV sources, Bell inequalities with the property that the optimal quantum value equals
the optimal no-signaling value are required. For such Bell inequalities (e.g. GHZ paradoxes [11],
pseudo-telepathy games [10] or Bell inequalities for graph states [13]) or those where the quantum
violation is close to algebraic (such as the chained Bell inequality [2]) the quantum set reaches the
corresponding facet of the no-signaling polytope.
In this paper we mainly focus on the chained Bell inequality, which has already been used in
the research on randomness and privacy amplification (see [4], [12] or [1]).
4II. MOTIVATION AND A TOY EXAMPLE
We now exemplify a possible attack that utilizes correlations between a weak source and de-
vice in the simplest scenario of boxes with binary inputs and outputs. Even though these boxes
do not constitute a resource for randomness amplification, the attack can already be described in
terms of these.
FIG. 1: Examples of bipartite boxes with binary inputs and outputs denoted by graphs. The Popescu-
Rohrlich box (on the left) and local (deterministic) boxes (on the right).
Imagine that Alice and Bob share a box L which is a mixture of local boxes Lij where i = 1, 3
label Alice’s inputs and j = 2, 4 label Bob’s inputs:
L =
1
4
(L12 + L32 + L34 + L14) . (3)
(See Fig. 1 where the PR box and local deterministic boxes are presented and Fig. 2, where the
boxes Lij are given explicitly). The bits from an ε-SV source are perfectly correlated to local boxes
as
P (Lij |S = (k, l)) = δik;jl =
{
1, i = k & j = l,
0, otherwise,
(4)
where S is the random variable describing bits from an ε-SV source.
In the protocols proposed so far such as [4], [12], it is demanded that I and S are perfectly
correlated, i.e.
P (I = (u, v)|S = (k, l)) = δuk;vl =
{
1, u = k & v = l,
0, otherwise,
(5)
which means that bits the from the ε-SV source are used as inputs to the box. All the correlations
are indicated in Fig. 2. Now, we see that although the box L is manifestly local, the honest parties
do not detect it in the protocols proposed so far. Indeed, correlations (4) and (5) imply that input
I = (k, l) may only be introduced to box Lkl, adapted exactly to this input, so that L mimics the
action of the PR box on any input. On the other hand, if there was independence between the
ε-SV source and the boxes, the parties would recognize that the object L is local.
To conclude, this toy example clearly illustrates that perfect correlation of inputs and devices
excludes any possibility of randomness amplification. To circumvent this type of attack, we intro-
duce the SV-condition for boxes, which is the weakest assumption (thus far) that still allows for
randomness amplification.
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FIG. 2: Bits from an ε-SV source (on the left) are perfectly correlated with local boxes supplied to honest
parties (on the right). Correlations decribed by Eq. (4) are indicated by blue arrows. Additionally, bits from
an ε-SV source are perfectly correlated with the inputs to boxes (see Eq. (5)), which is indicated by black
arrows. These correlations allow only for measuring green edges and hence Alice and Bob always observe
an optimal Bell value. If red edges could be measured, the locality of boxes would be detected.
III. RANDOMNESS AMPLIFICATION FOR A SINGLE NO-SIGNALING BOX
A. Correlations between the source and device: boxes determined by source
Let S denote a random variable which describes an arbitrary portion of subsequent bits from
an ε-SV source. Recall that we write I andO for variables which describe the inputs and outputs of
the device, respectively. Suppose that bits from an ε-SV source are delivered and simultaneously
boxes, that are possibly correlated to them, are supplied. Hence, our object of study is
P (O|I, S). (6)
Note that S determines how the device acts inside (see Fig. 3).
Remark 1. Even if conditional distributions of the form P (O = o|I = i, S = s) are equal for arbitrary
o, i, s, joint distributions P (O = o, I = i, S = s) do not have to be the same. This is just a fact which
follows from conventional and meaningful way of thinking about any devices.
B. SV-condition for boxes
Let us now precisely state the main assumption used in this paper, which we call the SV-
condition for boxes. Recall that S is a variable which describes an arbitrary portion of subsequent
6FIG. 3: A priori we allow arbitrary correlations between a source and a box (left). To illustrate how malicious
these correlations may be, we recall the example described in Section II (right). Bits from an ε-SV source
determine from which box the final output bit is taken. In general, arbitrary input bits may be introduced
to the box. The illustration for other Bell inequalities may be much more complicated, but the idea is the
same.
bits from an ε-SV source. Now, let S′ be a variable describing a disjoint portion of subsequent bits
chosen from the same ε-SV source which will be used as the input I to the device. Note that we
do not assume any temporal ordering between S and S′. Let ηmin, ηmax ∈ (0, 1) be some functions
of ε > 0 and |I| (denoting the number of measurement settings). Although we a priori allow for
arbitrary correlations between the source and device, there is one constraint which we impose,
namely that if S′ = s′ is input into the device with ηmin ≤ P (S = s|S′ = s′) ≤ ηmax, then S cannot
be guessed perfectly even after knowing the output O = o, i.e., for every realization o, s, s′
ηmin ≤ P (S = s|O = o, S′ = s′) ≤ ηmax for S, S′ such that ηmin ≤ P (S = s|S′ = s′) ≤ ηmax.
(7)
Remark 2. The distribution remains unchanged even if conditioned upon a variable e, which represents
some information prior to S′. To avoid unnecessary notation, we neglect it in the condition, since it is
irrelevant in what follows.
Assuming condition (7), which we henceforth call the SV-condition for boxes, we certainly
assume less than independence between the source and device. Note that the SV-condition for
boxes is clearly violated in the toy example from Section II. Indeed, suppose that there are some
testers who obtain further bits from the SV source denoted by the variable S′ (so that pmin ≤
P (S′ = s′|S = s) ≤ pmax and conversely ζmin ≤ P (S = s|S′ = s′) ≤ ζmax for some ζmin, ζmax ∈
(0, 1), whose explicit forms are derived in Appendix I) and input them into the box. When they
input S′ = s and observe an output that does not mimic the PR box, i.e. O 6= oPR, then due to the
perfect correlations between S and Lij they know that S 6= s, i.e., we have
P (S = s|S′ = s,O 6= oPR) = 0 (8)
which violates Eq. (7).
C. Comparison with assumptions in previous results
Let us now describe how the SV-condition for boxes assumption used in this paper differs
from the assumptions in previous results. Firstly, note that as shown by the attack described
7in Section II, to retain the possibility of randomness amplification, one has to necessarily make
some assumptions on the correlations between the source and the device. The intuition behind
the possible assumptions is the following: the SV source should remain the SV source even if
conditioned upon any possible event in the universe. In particular, it should remain an SV source
when conditioned upon the outputs of any available devices. In other words, if we input a portion
of bits from the SV source into a device, then any other portion of bits should still obey the SV
source conditions.
A stronger assumption that one may consider, is that for an input to the device that is indepen-
dent of the SV source, when conditioned on the output, the source should remain an SV source.
This condition is analogous to a similar condition on min-entropy sources, which is derived from
the assumption by Chung, Shi and Wu (CSW) in [8]. Namely, CSW consider a quantum scenario,
where the device D and the min-entropy source S are correlated as in the cq-state ρSD,
ρSD :=
∑
s
P (S = s)|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρDs (9)
and they assume that the quantum conditional min-entropyHmin(S|D)ρ of the source conditioned
on the device is greater than some constant k. This implies [3] that for any POVM measurement
{Ms} performed by an agent on the quantum register D, the probability of the agent correctly
guessing S, Pguess(S|D) is upper bounded. From no-signaling, it follows that the distribution
P (S = s) is the same for every measurement input I = i so that the joint distribution of variables
is of the form P (O = o, I = i, S = s) = P (O = o|I = i, S = s)P (I = i)P (S = s). The assumption
of Chung, Shi and Wu thus implies that for any input variable I independent of the source S, the
probability Pguess(S|D) obeys
Pguess(S|D) =
∑
s
P (O = s|I = i)P (S = s|O = s, I = i) ≤ 2−k ∀i. (10)
The above condition (whether in the scenario of a min-entropy source, or that of an SV source)
has the drawback of effectively introducing an agent that is not correlated with the weak source.
However we know that from two independent partially random sources one can extract perfect
randomness in the classical world. So the operational realization of the originally mathematical
condition might require the existence of an independent variable, implying the possibility of ob-
taining randomness right from the source and the agent’s variable, if the latter’s distribution was
not deterministic.
In this paper, we consider a somewhat intermediate assumption: we assume that the agent
(which we call the "tester") has a variable which describes subsequent bits drawn from the same
SV source (so that his variable will not be necessarily independent of the other portion of the SV
source, used as input by the users who want to draw randomness). However, we also assume
that the device is correlated with the tester’s variable only through the users’ variable, i.e. that
for any o, i, s, s′ we have P (O = o|I = i, S = s, S′ = s′) = P (O = o|I = i, S = s). This is
a clearly weaker assumption than the SV-analogue of the CSW condition, since if we take S′ to be
independent of S, we obtain the CSW condition, while in our case this condition need not be met,
and the dependence between S′ and S may be chosen by an adversary. In other words, in the SV
analogue of the CSW assumption, one requires that for some particular joint distribution (with
independent I and S), P (S|I,O) is still an SV source, irrespective of the protocol, while in our
case, the latter may hold for some other distribution, this time chosen adversarially for any given
protocol.
The threshold for the range of ε for which we will be able to amplify the SV source in the
present paper (obtained in Theorems 11 and 18) is weaker than the one obtained by Colbeck
8and Renner in [4]. This however is only to be expected as the scenario considered in this paper
is more general than the scenario analyzed in [4], which was based on the assumption that the
source and the device are independent. While the protocols of [5], [7] and [9] achieve randomness
amplification for the entire range of ε and the latter two protocols also tolerate noise within a
finite-device framework, they also do so under the assumption of independence between source
and device and are therefore incomparable with the results in this paper.
D. Scenario
The scenario is as follows. There are: an ε-SV source and a device correlated to some portion of
subsequent bits from the source, described by the variable S (see Fig. 4). The honest parties draw
S = s from the source and use it as an input to the box, which means that S and IHP , the random
variable describing the measurement settings of the honest parties, are perfectly correlated, i.e.
P (IHP = i|S = s) = δis for every i, s. (11)
The honest parties then test the statistics of a box for suitable violation of a certain Bell inequality.
   
DEVICE 
ARBITRARY 
CORRELATIONS 
   
 
PERFECTLY CORRELATED 
FIG. 4: Bits from an ε-SV source are used by honest parties as inputs. The correlation is given by Eq. (11).
E. The true and observed Bell value
In the most general form, the Bell value is given by the formula
δ =
∑
o,i
P (O = o, I = i)B(i, o), (12)
where B is an indicator vector for the Bell inequality and P is an arbitrary joint probability distri-
bution. We specify it depending on the context.
We are particularly interested in evaluating the true Bell value, as it informs us whether the
box delivers randomness or not. Let I denote all the settings appearing in the Bell expression. The
9true Bell value δtrue is calculated for variables Iindep, uniformly distributed (P (Iindep = i) = 1/|I|)
and independent from S. It is then defined as follows
δtrue =
1
|I|
∑
o,i
P (O = o|Iindep = i)B(i, o), (13)
where |I| is the number of measurement settings.
Further, we define the observed Bell value, i.e. we write Eq. (12) for IHP , determined by Eq.
(11), and obtain
δobsHP =
∑
o,s
P (S = s)P (O = o|IHP = s, S = s)B(s, o). (14)
The aim is to show that the true Bell value is small whenever the observed value is small, i.e.
the ratio δobsHP /δ
true
SV is controlled.
F. Testing the SV-condition for boxes
Honest parties test the statistics of a box using a certain Bell inequality. There is a danger that
they may be cheated, as exemplified in Section II. The ε-SV source can be correlated with the
device, as illustrated in Fig. 5 (on the left).
Since the honest parties only input IHP which is perfectly correlated to S,
P (IHP = i|S = s) = δi,s, (15)
they are themselves not able to verify whether the SV-condition for boxes (7) is violated or not.
Therefore, we consider testers who have access to part of the ε-SV source (SVtest), described by
the variable Stest, which is correlated with the device only through the variable S and does not
change the statistics of a box P (O|I, S) (see Fig. 5, on the right), i.e.
pmin ≤ P (Stest = s′|S = s) ≤ pmax for every s, s′ (16)
and
P (O|I, S, Stest) = P (O|I, S). (17)
When honest parties take the portion of bits S from the main part of source (they do not have
access to SVtest), to which the device is possibly correlated, the testers may be asked to perform
the measurement using their bits Stest as input, i.e.
P (Itest = i
′|Stest = s′) = δi′,s′ . (18)
The overall picture is now the following. We have two different joint distributions P (O, I, S, Stest)
and P (O, Itest, S, Stest). Conditional distributions are correlated as follows:
P (O = o|I = i, S = s, Stest = s′) Eq.(17)= P (O = o|I = i, S = s) (19)
Remark 1
= P (O = o|Itest = i, S = s) (20)
Eq.(17)
= P (O = o|Itest = i, S = s, Stest = s′) (21)
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for every o, i, i′, s, s′, where the pairs of variables I, S and Itest, Stest are each perfectly correlated.
As shown in Appendix I, we have that Eq. (16) implies
ζmin ≤ P (S = s|Itest = s′) ≤ ζmax, (22)
where ζmin and ζmax are functions of pmin, pmax and |I|, explicitly given by Eq. (89) in Appendix I.
Due to the SV-condition for boxes (7) this gives that
ζmin ≤ P (S = s|Itest = s′, O = o) ≤ ζmax for every s, s′, o. (23)
FIG. 5: (Left) The main part of the ε-SV source represented by variable S is correlated to the device, so
that S determines the box. (Right) Other bits denoted by variable Stest from the part of the ε-SV source
SVtest are correlated with the device only through the variable S. If bits are taken from SVtest and used as
inputs to the device, one can check whether the SV-condition for boxes in Eq.(7) is violated.
We now introduce an intermediate value between δobsHP and δ
true:
δtrueSV =
∑
o,s′
P (O = o, Itest = s
′)B(s′, o), (24)
where Itest is a random variable satisfying Eq. (16). Note that, according to the observation in
Remark 1 , we obtain
δtrue
Eq. (13)
=
1
|I|
∑
o,i,s
P (S = s)P (O = o|Iindep = i, S = s)B(i, o)
Remark1
=
1
|I|
∑
o,i,s
P (S = s)
P (O = o, Itest = i, S = s)B(i, o)
P (Itest = i, S = s)
=
1
|I|
∑
o,i,s
1
P (Itest = i|S = s)P (O = o, Itest = i, S = s)B(i, o)
(25)
and hence, according to Eq. (16) and the definition of δtrueSV in Eq.(24), we have
1
pmax|I|δ
true
SV ≤ δtrue ≤
1
pmin|I|δ
true
SV . (26)
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G. Results and proofs
At this point, let us explicitly restate all the assumptions used in the paper for clarity:
1. There are spatially separated honest parties who share a no-signaling box, i.e., one con-
strained by conditions Eq.(2).
2. Correlations between the source and the device are only limited by the SV-condition for
boxes (see Eq. (7)). The device is correlated to the main part of the source from which
honest parties draw their bits represented by variable S (see Eq. (11)).
3. There exists another part of the source, called SVtest, which may only be used (by testers)
to verify whether the SV-condition for boxes is violated. Stest drawn from SVtest is only
correlated with the device through the variable S and does not change the statistics of the
box as given in Eq.(17).
The main result of this Section is the following.
Theorem 3. Under assumptions 1-3 we obtain
δobsHP
δtrue
≥ |I|pminζmin
pmax
. (27)
Proof. Note that Eqs. (23) and (16), as well as Remark 1, imply that
δobsHP
Eq. (14)
=
∑
o,s
P (S = s)P (O = o|IHP = s, S = s)B(s, o)
Remark1
=
∑
o,s
P (S = s)P (O = o|Itest = s, S = s)B(s, o)
=
∑
o,s
P (S = s)
P (O = o, S = s|Itest = s)
P (S = s|Itest = s) B(s, o)
=
∑
o,s
P (S = s)P (Itest = s)
P (S = s, Itest = s)
P (S = s|O = o, Itest = s)P (O = o|Itest = s)B(s, o)
Eq. (23)
≥ ζmin
∑
o,s
1
P (Itest = s|S = s)P (O = o, Itest = s)B(s, o)
Eq. (16),Eq.(18)
≥ ζmin
pmax
∑
s,o
P (O = o, Itest = s)B(s, o)
Eq. (24)
=
ζmin
pmax
δtrueSV .
(28)
Referring to Eq. (26), we obtain
δobsHP ≥ |I|
pminζmin
pmax
δtrue, (29)
which completes the proof.
Remark 4. Suppose that assumptions 1-3 are satisfied. Note that any Bell value (of non-local boxes)
observed in a lab can be predicted by the rules of quantum mechanics and hence we set
δobsHP = δQ. (30)
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Further, due to Theorem 3, we obtain
δtrue ≤ δQ pmax|I|pminζmin , (31)
where ζmin, pmin and pmax depend on both |I| and ε. The above inequality allows to set an upper bound for
ε (as |I| → ∞), as illustrated in the example of the chained Bell inequality below.
IV. EXAMPLE - RANDOMNESS AMPLIFICATION USING CHAINED BELL INEQUALITIES
A. The chained Bell inequality
The chained Bell inequality considers the bipartite scenario of two spatially separated parties
Alice and Bob. Let n ∈ Z+ be an arbitrary positive even integer. Let the setsUA := {1, 3, . . . , n− 1}
and UB := {2, 4, . . . , n} correspond to the measurement settings chosen by Alice and Bob, respec-
tively. Each measurement pair (u, v), where u ∈ UA, v ∈ UB , results in a binary outcome x ∈ {0, 1}
for Alice and y ∈ {0, 1} for Bob. The chained Bell inequality is then written as [2]
1
n
 ∑
u,v:|u−v|=1
P (O = (x, y)|I = (u, v))[x⊕ y = 1] + P (O = (x, y)|I = (1, n))[x⊕ y = 0]
 ≥ 1
n
,
(32)
where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2 and [B] denotes the Iverson bracket taking value 1 when B
is true and 0 otherwise.
Remark 5. Note that out of the n2/4 possible measurement pairs, only n neighbouring pairs, forming
a chain, are considered in the inequality.
For clarity, we further label the inputs pairs by the number of the edge in the chain (see Remark
5), i.e., instead of a pair (u, v), where u ∈ UA, v ∈ UB and |u − v| = 1, we set i := min{u, v}.
Similarly, the remaining pair in a chain (1, n) is denoted by n. Note that the true Bell value for
an arbitrary box P is then given by
δtrue(P ) =
1
n
∑
i 6=n
P (O = (x, y)|I = i)[x⊕ y = 1] + P (O = (x, y)|I = n)[x⊕ y = 0]
 , (33)
while the observed value is of the form
δobsAB(P ) =
∑
s 6=n
P (S = s)P (O = (x, y)|I = s, S = s)[x⊕ y = 1] (34)
+ P (S = n)P (O = (x, y)|I = n, S = n)[x⊕ y = 0]. (35)
We recall that results observed in a lab are not better than the values predicted by the rules of
quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics violates (32) and provides a value of
δQ := sin
2(pi/2n), (36)
which tends to 0, as n → ∞, with a rate of convergence 1/n2. This optimal quantum value is ob-
tained by measuring on the maximally entangled state |φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) with the measure-
ment settings defined by the bases {|α〉, |α+pi〉}, α ∈ pin{0, 2, . . . , n−2}, for Alice and {|β〉, |β+pi〉},
β ∈ pin{1, 3, . . . , n− 1}, for Bob, where |·〉 = cos(·/2)|0〉+ sin(·/2)|1〉.
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B. Value of chained Bell inequalities on boxes
While testing the chained Bell inequality, we do not distinguish between boxes with the same
probability distributions for neighboring pairs of settings. Hence, we consider only two types of
extremal boxes: ideal or "bad". Any other box may be represented as a mixture of these boxes,
due to the characterization of the extremal boxes for this scenario in [14].
We call boxes ideal (Pideal) if they violate the chained Bell inequality (32) maximally and give
perfectly random bits (boxes Pideal play for the chained Bell inequality the same role as PR-boxes
play for the CHSH inequality). With respect to the probability distributions significant for the
chained Bell expression, there is exactly one box violating (32) to 0 (compare with Remark 5).
Precisely, this is the no-signaling box with structure of perfect correlations for the n−1 neighboring
pairs in the sum and a perfect anti-correlation for the remaining pair n (see [14] for details). Then,
δtrue(Pideal) =
1
n
∑
i 6=n
Pideal(O = (x, y)|I = i)[x⊕ y = 1] + Pideal(O = (x, y)|I = n)[x⊕ y = 0]
 = 0.
(37)
In classical theory, there are no ideal boxes. The notion Pbad is used for these extremal (local
deterministic) boxes whose Bell value is at least 1/n, which means that there is at least one con-
tradiction with probability distributions of ideal boxes (for neighboring pairs of settings). Apart
from purely classical boxes there are also other bad boxes which do not violate the chained Bell in-
equality (32) (some of them even give randomness, but are inappropriate for the chosen inequality
(32)). Convex combinations of boxes Pbad are denoted by PBAD. By convexity,
δtrue(PBAD) ≥ 1/n. (38)
Remark 6. Any box P is a mixture of boxes which attain an optimal Bell value 0 and boxes which do not
violate the chained Bell inequality
P = (1− ΛP )Pideal + ΛPPBAD, ΛP ∈ [0, 1]. (39)
Corollary 7. The true Bell value for an arbitrary box P is estimated as follows
δtrue(P ) ≥ ΛP /n, (40)
where ΛP is defined by Eq. (39).
Proof. Note that, according to Remark 6, we obtain
δtrue(P )
Eq. (39)
= δtrue ((1− ΛP )Pideal + ΛPPBAD) = (1− ΛP )δtrue (Pideal) + ΛP δtrue (PBAD) (41)
Eq. (37)
= ΛP δ
true (PBAD)
Eq. (38)
≥ ΛP /n. (42)
C. The chained Bell inequality and randomness
Let I = i, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be any chosen input to a box P . To measure the distance between
an output bit and a random bit obtained from the box P we introduce the following quantity
d(P ) = max
i
{di(P )}, (43)
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where
di(P ) =
1
2
(∣∣∣p(P )i (0)− 1/2∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣p(P )i (1)− 1/2∣∣∣) , (44)
and
p
(P )
i (x) =
∑
y∈{0,1}
P (O = (x, y)|I = i) [x⊕ y = 0] for i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
p(P )n (x) =
∑
y∈{0,1}
P (O = (x, y)|I = n) [x⊕ y = 1]
(45)
for x ∈ {0, 1}. Note that for boxes Pideal, which generate randomness, we have pPideali (0) =
p
Pideal
i (1) = 1/2 for every i. Due to Eq. (39), we further obtain
p
(P )
i (x) = ΛP p
BAD
i (x) + (1− ΛP )
1
2
, (46)
where pBADi is generated by boxes PBAD and, in the worst case, it is some deterministic function.
Proposition 8. Let d(P ) be defined by Eq. (43) for every box P of the form (39). Then
d(P ) ≤ ΛP
2
≤ n
2
δtrue(P ). (47)
Proof. Let us bound the distance d from above. Following Eqs. (43) and (46), we obtain
d(P ) =
ΛP
2
max
i
{|pBADi (0)− 1/2|+ |pBADi (1)− 1/2|} ≤
ΛP
2
. (48)
Note that, due to Eq. (40) of Corollary 7, we obtain that
d(P ) ≤ ΛP
2
≤ n
2
δtrue(P ), (49)
which completes the proof and indicates that small true chained Bell value of any box P guaran-
tees that the distribution of the output bit obtained from it is close to uniform.
D. Randomness versus observed Bell value
Theorem 3 and Remark 4 imply for the chained Bell inequality that provided we observe a Bell
value of δQ from a box P , i.e., δobsHP (P ) = δQ, then the true Bell value of the box can be bounded as
δtrue(P ) ≤ δQ pmax
npminζmin
, (50)
where δQ is given by Eq. (36) and
pmin :=
p2r−
np2r+
, pmax :=
p2r+
p2r+ + (n− 1)p2r−
, ζmin =
p2min
np2max
(51)
for r = log(n/2). The estimates come from [4] and Appendix I and are obtained using Remark 5.
Even more accurate estimates are given in [12]. Furthermore, we have that the distance of the
output bit obtained from the box with such an observed value can be bounded as follows.
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Proposition 9. For d(P ) given by Eq. (43) we obtain
d(P ) ≤ δQ pmax
2pminζmin
. (52)
Proof. The proof is an easy observation, which follows from Proposition 8 and Theorem 3, as well
as Remark 4 (see Eqs. (47) and (50)).
Remark 10. In the next Subsection we determine the threshold for ε, below which the right hand side of
inequality (52) tends to zero, as n→∞, and hence almost full randomness of output bits is obtained.
E. Calculating the threshold for ε
Let us restate the assumptions in the context of the chained Bell inequality:
1. Alice and Bob are spatially separated and share a no-signaling box with two input sets of
size n/2 and two binary outputs, which violates the chained Bell inequality up to δQ. They
choose their settings, each using r = log(n/2) bits from the main part of the ε-SV source (n
is taken to be an appropriate integer of the form 2r+1), i.e., the variable IHP describing their
inputs, is perfectly correlated with S as in Eq.(11) .
2. The SV-condition for boxes (7) is satisfied with pmin, pmax, ζmin given by (51).
3. The main part of the source is correlated with the device used by Alice and Bob. Another
part, called SVtest, is not directly correlated with a device, it is only used to check whether
the SV-condition for boxes is violated (details are described in Section III.E).
Theorem 11. Assume that conditions 1-3 are satisfied. Then, ε < (
21/12−1)
2(21/12+1)
(≈ 0.0144) guarantees full
randomness of the output in the asymptotic scenario of a large number of inputs n→∞.
Remark 12. The threshold is in fact slightly bigger (precisely it is (2
1/6(2−c)−1)
2(21/6(2−c)+1) ≈ 0.0162 where c solves
H(c/2) = 1/2 for the binary entropy H), which can be proven with more accurate approximations for
pmin, pmax and ζmin, obtained by using the Ky Fan norm (see [12]), i.e., in the regime of large n
pmin =
p2r−
p2r− + 2rp
(2−c)r
+ p
cr−
pmax =
p2r+
p2r+ + 2
rp
(2−c)r
− pcr+
. (53)
Proof. Proposition 9 and Remark 10 imply that to verify that output bits are fully random (d→ 0)
it is enough to show that
∆ := δQ
pmax
2pminζmin
→ 0, as n→∞. (54)
Following Eqs. (36), (51), we obtain
∆ =
1
2
sin2
( pi
2n
) pmax
pmin
p2min
np2max
≤ 1
2
( pi
2n
)2 np3max
p3min
=
(
pi2
8
)
1
n
p3max
p3min
=
(
pi2
8
)
1
n
p6r+(
p2r+ + (n− 1)p2r−
)3 n3p6r+p6r−
=
(
pi2
8
)
n2p12r+
p6r−
(
p2r+ + (n− 1)p2r−
)3
(55)
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Setting n = 2r+1, we have
∆ =
(
pi2
8
)
4r+1p12r+
p6r−
(
p2r+ + (2
r+1 − 1) p2r−
)3 . (56)
Let us now consider the asymptotic scenario of a large number of settings r →∞,
lim
r→∞
4r+1p12r+
p6r−
(
p2r+ + (2
r+1 − 1) p2r−
)3 = 0, (57)
which imposes that ε is bounded as
ε <
21/12 − 1
2
(
21/12 + 1
) ≈ 0.0144. (58)
Therefore, for the range 0 ≤ ε < 21/12−1
2(21/12+1)
, we obtain a random output in the asymptotic scenario
of a large number of inputs.
V. THE PROTOCOL FOR THE CHAINED BELL INEQUALITY
Protocol
1. The honest parties Alice and Bob choose their measurement settings ui ∈ UA, vi ∈
UB for each of the runs i = 1, . . . ,M where the input sets are of size |UA| = |UB| =
n/2 ((see Section IV A for the precise definitions of UA, UB). To do so, in each
run they use log2(n/2) bits from an ε-SV source. Simultaneously, a sequence of M
boxes is supplied.
2. They check that the cardinality |S| of the set S defined as
S := {i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} : |ui − vi| = 1 ∨ (ui, vi) = (1, n)} (59)
satisfies |S| ∈ [2Mn , 6Mn ]. If not, they set the output to R = Fail and abort the
protocol.
3. They verify that xi = yi for every i ∈ S, (ui, vi) 6= (1, n) or xi 6= yi for i ∈ S,
(ui, vi) = (1, n). If any one of these conditions is not satisfied, they set R = Fail and
abort.
4. They use further bits from the ε-SV source to choose f ∈ S which indicates the
position of the box, from which an output bit xf is recorded. The protocol outputs
R = xf .
Remark 13. In Step 1, we require |S| ∈ [2M/n, 6M/n], since the probability of uniformly choosing
neighboring measurement settings is exactly P (i ∈ S) = 4/n, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
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Remark 14. In the proof we set M := (n/2)2.99 and take n such that log n and logM/n are integers. We
have that (2M)/n = (n/2)1.99 and (6M)/n = 3(n/2)1.99 and the number of boxes labeled by i ∈ S is
slightly smaller than (n/2)2 (for large n). This ensures that the protocol does not abort when run with the
optimal quantum strategy while it does abort when run with classical boxes.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE RANDOMNESS AMPLIFICATION PROTOCOL
A. Parameters
The parameters of the general problem are denoted by m, n and a. Here m is the number of
boxes (runs) in the protocol (m = |S| in the protocol above based on the chained Bell inequality),
n is the number of input pairs that enter the inequality and a is the probability that in any run,
a local box attempting to mimic an ideal box is not detected by the measurement.
B. Attacks on the protocol due to lack of independence
Consider that an adversary prepares a sequence of boxes of length m, and the honest parties
obtain bits from the source to input as measurement settings in the runs i = 1, . . . ,m. In the
previously considered scenario in [4], the assumption of independence between the source and
device implies that the observation by the honest parties of the ideal sequence of measurement
outcomes (i.e., compatible with the optimal violation) guarantees that the true Bell value of the
devices used in the protocol is also optimal. Moreover, the distribution of the further bits drawn to
choose f ∈ S (the position of the box from which the final output bit is drawn) is also independent
of the device. Therefore, when the tests in the protocol are passed, the boxes used must be optimal
(i.e., as n → ∞, we have that δtrue → 0 faster than 1n ), and perfect randomness may be obtained
from the output.
The relaxation of the independence assumption means that the sequence of boxes supplied by
the adversary may be correlated with the bits that the honest parties use in the protocol . This
implies that for any given sequence of inputs and corresponding observed outputs (I = i, O = o),
there is a class of box sequences that is compatible with this (i, o). We denote such a class in what
follows as a "cloud" of box sequences. Moreover, the bit string corresponding to position f is
drawn from the same SV source, which means that the SV-condition for boxes in Eq.(7) applies to
it. We will therefore consider attacks limited by the SV-condition as in the following remarks.
Remark 15. Correlations between measurement settings from the source and boxes are the same as in
Sections III and IV, so only the SV-condition for boxes (7) limits them.
Remark 16. We allow attacks in which correlations between sequences of |S| boxes and the number f are
only limited as in Eq.(68) which follows from the SV- condition for boxes.
However, we do not solve the case of the most general attack strategy limited by these two
remarks in this paper, and will also make some further "symmetry" assumptions on the attack
strategies that we will make explicit in what follows.
C. Types of sequences
See Section IV to recall what is meant by ideal and bad boxes. Let us introduce the following
notation. We say that a sequence of extremal boxes is of type j if it contains exactly j bad boxes.
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Let Pj denote the probability of the class of box sequences of type j. Obviously,
m∑
j=1
Pj = 1. (60)
Note that within a sequence of m boxes, j bad boxes may be arranged in
(
m
j
)
different ways (see
Fig. 6)
FIG. 6: Possible arrangements of two bad boxes in a sequence of four boxes.
Let us consider the case when any bad box has exactly one contradiction when compared with
the correlations in an ideal box. In this case, there are
(
m
j
)
nj possible sequences of type j (since the
contradiction can happen in any one of the n different measurement pairs, see an example in Fig.
7). Furthermore, consider the case when every sequence of type j is equally likely, i.e. appears
with the same probability rj , this gives that
Pj =
(
m
j
)
njrj . (61)
D. The notion of clouds
If we measure a bad box, we may either observe a contradiction with the correlations in an
ideal box or not. Not observing a contradiction does not guarantee that the box is ideal. This leads
to the notion of clouds, i.e., classes of boxes compatible with a given sequence of observations for
a chosen sequence of measurement inputs. If 1 denotes the event that a contradiction is observed
and 0 denotes the complementary event, the pattern of zeros and ones (of length m), together
with the chosen sequence of measurement settings, defines the cloud. Let a sequence of measure-
ment settings be fixed. We denote the cloud by Cl, where l = (l1, . . . , lm) and l1, . . . , lm ∈ {0, 1}.
Note that |l| = ∑mj=1 lj delivers information about the number of detected contradictions, hence
detected bad boxes. So there are at least |l| bad boxes in the sequence which has been measured
(see Figs. 8 and 9). Hence, in every cloud Cl there are boxes of type q for q ≥ |l|, but only of
certain arrangements, determined by the performed measurements (see Fig. 8 for an example set
of arrangements).
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FIG. 7: There are nj sequences of type j and of certain arrangement, e.g. in case of CHSH inequality,
16 different sequences are of type 2 and arrangement: 2 PR-boxes and 2 bad boxes. The edges with
mismatched correlations are marked in red.
FIG. 8: The cloud C(1,1,0,0) (with 2 detected bad boxes).First two boxes are bad, which is known after
performing a measurement, the next two may be either ideal or bad boxes.
Note that detecting a contradiction gives certainty that the box is bad, as well as the knowledge
where exactly the contradiction appears. Not detecting a contradiction delivers only information
that there is no contradiction at the certain edge which has been measured. We may not exclude
the possibility that there is a contradiction at any other (non-measured) edge (which is also indi-
cated in the example in Fig. 8). It should be noted that clouds overlap at each other, i.e., the same
sequence of boxes may appear in multiple clouds. Let Ql = P (Cl) for |l| = l. Referring to the
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Measured edges 
Not measured edges 
Sequences 
of type 2 
Sequences 
of type 3 
Sequences 
of type 4 
Not measured edges  
 (with mismatched correlations) 
FIG. 9: The cloud C(1,1,0,0) in case of CHSH inequality. First two boxes are bad, which is known after
performing a measurement, the next two may be either PR-boxes or bad boxes.
above analysis, we obtain
Ql =
m−l∑
s=0
(
m− l
s
)
(n− 1)srl+s for l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (62)
Note that there are
(
m
l
)
clouds which appear with probability Ql.
E. The attack strategy
Let us consider an attack strategy of the adversary that attempts to pass the protocol with
a classical box of true Bell value at least 1/n so that honest parties are not able to obtain a random
bit.
Recall that f ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is the number drawn using bits from the ε-SV source, which indi-
cates the position of a box in a sequence from which the final bit is recorded. Let an arbitrary
sequence of type k be denoted by Seqk. Then, we consider the attack strategy given by the joint
probability of f and all possibly supplied sequences which satisfy the following condition
P
(
f = i|Seqk
)
=
{
1/k for i ∈ {indices defining the position of bad boxes in Seqk}
0 for i ∈ {indices defining the position of ideal boxes in Seqk}.
(63)
The attack is exemplified in Fig. 10.
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P(f=5|Seq  )=1/3 3 
P(f=6|Seq  )=1/3 3 
P(f=7|Seq  )=1/3 3 
P(f=3|Seq  )=1 1 
P(f=1|Seq  )=1 1 
FIG. 10: The probability of f is spread uniformly over bad boxes.
F. Assumptions on the attack strategy
We assume that in the attack strategy, any bad box has exactly one contradiction when com-
pared with the correlations in an ideal box. That any attack strategy without this assumption is
strictly weaker is justified in Appendix II, intuitively it is clear that using local boxes with more
contradictions simply decreases the probability of acceptance for the protocol (since the observed
Bell value increases) in comparison to using boxes with a single contradiction while yielding the
same lack of randomness in the output.
After taking the above considerations into account, we end with the following assumptions on
the particular attack considered in this paper, whose relaxation might lead to a stronger attack on
the protocol considered, and will therefore be investigated in future work.
1. We assume that the attack is symmetric in the sense that every box sequence of a particular
type j (i.e., consisting of j bad boxes) appears with the same probability as in Eq.(61).
2. We assume that in the attack, the f drawn from the source is distributed uniformly over the
bad boxes for any particular sequence Seqk as specified in Eq. (63).
3. We assume that the attack consists of box sequences made of extremal boxes for each run,
and defer the consideration of the general attack consisting of a large box coherent over all
runs for future work.
To be consistent with assumption 2, we also set the probability that the adversary supplies the
box sequence consisting of only ideal boxes to be zero, i.e., P0 = 0, these boxes generate per-
fect random output over all runs so that using such boxes does not give any advantage to the
adversary.
G. Probability of acceptance of the protocol
Recall that a denotes the probability of not detecting a contradiction with the correlations of
an ideal box when measuring a bad box in a single run. Then, the probability of not aborting the
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protocol, which happens if and only if the correlations in all the runs are compatible with the ideal
correlations, is described by the following expression
P (ACC) =
m∑
k=1
Pka
k. (64)
In this scenario, the protocol does not abort, the attack succeeds and the honest parties do not
obtain randomness. Let us now compute a for the protocol based on the chained inequality. Note
that, since only one measurement can be performed, the probability that an edge with contradic-
tion is measured is, in case of uniform and independent inputs, as small as 1/n and is even smaller
in the case of inputs taken from the source. Due to Theorem 3,
nδtrue
(
pminζmin
pmax
)
≤ δobs, (65)
so that the probability that an edge with contradiction is measured by Alice and Bob is bounded
from below by pminζmin/pmax, which in turn implies that
a = 1− pminζmin
pmax
. (66)
Note that when we consider the probability of not detecting that a subsequent box is local, it is
a conditional probability with all proceeding measurements in the condition (see Remark 2 in
Section III about an arbitrary random variable e that is prior to the protocol).
In the rest of the paper, we will show that the protocol stays secure under the attack described,
i.e., it aborts if the attack described by Eq. (63), is performed.
H. Constraints following from the SV-condition for boxes
We have that plogm− ≤ P (f = i|a sequence of measurements) ≤ plogm+ , since f is a bit string
drawn from the ε-SV source after the bits corresponding to the sequence of measurements are
drawn from the same source. The assumed SV-condition for boxes in Eq.(7) then implies that
plogm− ≤ P (f = i|a sequence of measurements and outcomes) ≤ plogm+ (67)
for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the sequence
of measurements and outcomes and its corresponding cloud. Suppose that measurement settings
are fixed and some outcomes are obtained. Then the appropriate cloud Cl is determined and we
have
plogm− ≤ P
(
f = i|Cl
)
≤ plogm+ for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (68)
Let us set c+ := p
logm
+ and k := |l|. Since P (ACC), given by Eq. (64), is defined in terms of
probabilities Pk (see Eq. (61)), condition (68) should also be rewritten in this way. Due to the
definition of attack (see Eq. (63)) and the properties of clouds, we obtain
m−k∑
s=0
(
1
k + s
− c+
)(
k + s
k
)(
n− 1
n
)s
Pk+s ≤ 0. (69)
The derivation of Eq.(69) is given in Appendix III.
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I. Probability of acceptance as a linear program
The probability of acceptance can therefore be formulated as the following linear program. We
want to maximize the expression
m∑
k=1
Pka
k (70)
such that
m−k∑
s=0
(
1
k + s
− c+
)(
k + s
k
)(
n− 1
n
)s
Pk+s ≤ 0 for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (71)
m∑
k=1
Pk ≤ 1 and
m∑
k=1
−Pk ≤ −1, (72)
where the problem constraints follow from Eqs. (69) and (61). Obviously,
Pk ≥ 0 for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (73)
Note that the linear program written above is at once in its standard form, that is
max
{
~cT~x
}
such that A~x ≤ ~b
and the variables are non-negative ~x ≥ 0,
(74)
where ~x = (P1, . . . , Pm)T , ~c =
(
a, a2, . . . , am
)T ,~b = (0, . . . , 0, 1,−1)T and A is a (m+ 2)×m matrix
A =

(
1
0
) (
n−1
n
)0
(1− c+)
(
2
1
) (
n−1
n
)1 (1
2 − c+
) (
3
2
) (
n−1
n
)2 (1
3 − c+
)
. . .
(
m
m−1
) (
n−1
n
)m−1 ( 1
m − c+
)
0
(
2
0
) (
n−1
n
)0 (1
2 − c+
) (
3
1
) (
n−1
n
)1 (1
3 − c+
)
. . .
(
m
m−2
) (
n−1
n
)m−2 ( 1
m − c+
)
0 0
(
3
0
) (
n−1
n
)0 (1
3 − c+
)
. . .
(
m
m−3
) (
n−1
n
)m−3 ( 1
m − c+
)
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . .
(
m
0
) (
n−1
n
)0 ( 1
m − c+
)
1 1 1 . . . 1
−1 −1 −1 . . . −1

.
(75)
J. Dual problem
We consider the dual problem: 
min{~bT~y}
AT~y ≥ ~c
~y ≥ 0.
(76)
By linear programming duality, if either the primal or dual has an optimal solution, then both
have optimal solutions and the optimal values of the objective functions of these problems are
equal.
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In our case the dual problem is as follows
min{ym+1 − ym+2} (77)
such that
k−1∑
r=0
(
k
r
)(
n− 1
n
)r ( 1
m
− c+
)
yk−r + ym+1 − ym+2 ≥ ak for k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (78)
and
y1 ≥ 0, . . . , ym ≥ 0, ym+1 ≥ 0, ym+2 ≥ 0. (79)
We find the following feasible solution to the dual, formulated as Lemma 17 and proven in Ap-
pendix IV.
y1 =
a1/c+(1− a)(
1
c+
+ 1
) (
n−1
n
)1/c+ , y2 = y3 = . . . = ym = ym+2 = 0, ym+1 = a1/c+ . (80)
Lemma 17. Hypothesis (80) gives a feasible solution of dual problem described by Eqs. (77) and (78).
K. The optimal solution
In fact, Eq.(80) is not only a bound on the probability of acceptance but is in fact an optimal
solution to the linear program. To prove that the above solution is optimal, we will show that the
objective functions of both, primal and dual, problems are equal.
Suppose that the solution of the primal problem is given by
Pu =
1
(1 + s(u, v))
, Pv =
s(u, v)
(1 + s(u, v))
, Pk = 0 for k /∈ {u, v}, (81)
where
s(u, v) =
un (c+ − 1/u)
v(n− 1) (1/v − c+) > 0 for u ≤
1
c+
≤ v. (82)
If we set
u =
1
c+
, v =
1
c+
+ 1, (83)
we obtain P1/c+ = 1 and P(1/c++1) = 0 and therefore
max
{
m∑
k=1
Pka
k
}
= a1/c+ = min {ym+1 − ym+2} , (84)
which indicates that the solution is indeed optimal. However, we should note that to be more
accurate, we should take u and v as natural numbers, i.e.
u =
⌊
1
c+
⌋
, v =
⌊
1
c+
⌋
+ 1. (85)
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L. Results for the chained Bell inequality
Set a = (1 − pminζmin/pmax) (from Section VI.E) and m = |S| = (n/2)1.99 (which follows from
the requirements of the protocol and the rules of quantum mechanics, see Remark 14). We approx-
imate terms pmin, pmax and ζmin as we did in Eq. (51). Using the solution of linear programming
from the previous section, we obtain that P (ACC) is bounded from above by
a
1/
(
p
log2(m)
+
)
. (86)
The bound converges to zero, as n→∞, for every ε solving the inequality
(0.5− ε)12 − 2(0.5 + ε)13.99 > 0, (87)
which approximately gives 0 < ε < 0.0132.
The main result of this Section is hence the following.
Theorem 18. Assuming the correlations between the source and device are constrained as in Remarks 15,
16 and under the assumptions on the attack strategy outlined in Section VI.F, the protocol in Section V is
safe for ε < 0.0132 (or more precisely for ε solving the inequality (0.5− ε)12 − 2(0.5 + ε)13.99 > 0).
Remark 19. The threshold is in fact slightly bigger than 0.0132, which can be proven with more accurate
approximations for pmin, pmax and ζmin, obtained by using the Ky Fan norm (from [12].)
M. Summary and closing remarks
We have studied the protocol of Colbeck and Renner [4] under relaxed assumptions which
allow for correlations between the Santha-Vazirani source with the devices used in the protocol.
We have proven, that in spite of such an attack, a non-zero range of parameter of ε-SV source
allows for randomness amplification in the asymptotic limit of a large number of settings. More
precisely, the protocol (see Section V) is safe for a restricted range of ε even if we admit
(1) correlations between measurement settings and devices, only limited by the SV-condition
for boxes (see Sections III and IV),
(2) attacks such that f is always pointing to local boxes, i.e. boxes with no intrinsic randomness
(correlations of sequences of boxes with f are only limited by condition (68), described in
details in Section VI).
Our intuition, based on the experience gained while working with the SV-condition for boxes,
is that the attacks, which we analyze in this paper are the strongest possible. Nevertheless, it
is not yet formally proven that we can admit the symmetry assumptions in the attack without
loss of generality. This is the aim for future work. Another interesting line of research, which is
already in progress, aims to determine whether the attack can be physically performed or not,
i.e., whether the correlations between the weak source and the devices can be created by the
adversary physically without breaking the SV condition at this stage. Finally, an important open
question is whether the techniques used in this paper can be generalized to relax the assumption
of independence in the finite-device protocols of [7], [9] so as to obtain randomness amplification
for the entire range of ε, while tolerating a constant level of noise.
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Appendix I
Suppose that A and B are some portions of bits from an ε-SV source of the same length |A| =
|B|. Fix a¯, b¯ ∈ I. We assume that the probability we consider is normalized, i.e. ∑a∈I P (A = a) =
1.
Let us prove that condition
pmin ≤ P (B = b¯|A = a¯) ≤ pmax (88)
implies that
ζmin ≤ P (A = a¯|B = b¯) ≤ ζmax, (89)
where
ζmin =
p2min
|I|p2max
ζmax = 1− (|I| − 1)ζmin. (90)
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Note that the definition of an ε-SV source (1) implies that
P (A = a¯, B = b¯) = P (A = a¯)P (B = b¯|A = a¯) ≥ p2min. (91)
Let us now estimate
P (B = b¯) =
∑
a∈I
P (A = a,B = b¯) ≤ p2max|I|. (92)
We obtain
P (A = a¯|B = b¯) = P (A = a¯, B = b¯)
P (B = b¯)
≥ p
2
min
|I|p2max
, (93)
which proves the left side of Eq. (89). The formula for ζmax may be justified as follows
P (A = a¯|B = b¯) = 1−
∑
a∈I\{a¯}
P (A = a|B = b¯) ≤ 1− ζmin(|I| − 1). (94)
Appendix II
Let us justify that to prove that the protocol is safe it is enough to consider boxes with either
zero or one contradiction with the correlations of ideal boxes. It should be noted that using bad
boxes with more than one contradiction simply decreases the probability of acceptance P(ACC)
for the protocol, making the observed Bell value bigger. We now show that the attack with bad
boxes possessing more than one contradiction can be improved by replacing these boxes with 1-
contradiction boxes. There is now only one more issue that needs attention. Due to the symmetry
assumption, on which our analysis is based, we need to replace boxes in such a way, that the
final ensemble is symmetric. Fortunately, it can be easily achieved, as illustrated by the following
example.
Suppose that any box with k contradictions on edges e1, . . . , ek is replaced (with probability
1/k) by one of boxes with exactly one contradiction at one of edges e1, . . . , ek. Then, if we assume
that all boxes with k contradictions are equally likely and are treated as described above, we will
obtain the symmetric ensemble used in the main text, which justifies that constraints used in
linear programming remain the same.
Appendix III
Here, we derive the constraints on the linear program Eq. (69) from Section IV.F.
Recall that k := |l|. Let us introduce introduce disjoint sets Tk+s, s ∈ {0, . . . ,m− k}, such that⋃m−k
s=0 Tk+s = Cl. Every set Tk+s consists of sequences with k + s bad boxes and belongs to the
cloud Cl, which simply means that it is fixed where k detected bad boxes (with contradictions on
measured edges) are. Note that
|Tk+s| =
(
m− k
s
)
(n− 1)s. (95)
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We now obtain
P
(
f = i|Cl
)
=
P (f = i, Cl)
Qk
=
1
Qk
m−k∑
s=0
P (f = i, Tk+s)
=
1
Qk
m−k∑
s=0
∑
Seqk+s∈Tk+s
P (f = i|Seqk+s)P (Seqk+s).
(96)
Let us assume that i is defining the position of some detected bad box, which means that i is
defining the position of a bad box in every Seqk+s belonging to cloud Cl. Following the definition
of the attack (see Eq. (63)), as well as Eq. (95), we obtain
P
(
f = i|Cl
)
=
1
Qk
m−k∑
s=0
1
k + s
∑
Seqk+s∈Tk+s
rk+s =
1
Qk
m−k∑
s=0
1
k + s
rk+s|Tk+s|
=
1
Qk
m−k∑
s=0
1
k + s
rk+s
(
m− k
s
)
(n− 1)s.
(97)
We further obtain (due to Eqs. (68) and (62))
m−k∑
s=0
1
k + s
(
m− k
s
)
(n− 1)srk+s ≤ c+Qk =
m−k∑
s=0
c+
(
m− k
s
)
(n− 1)srk+s, (98)
which gives
m−k∑
s=0
(
1
k + s
− c+
)(
m− k
s
)
(n− 1)srk+s ≤ 0. (99)
Then, according to the definition of Pj (see Eq. (61)), we have
1(
m
k
)
nk
m−k∑
s=0
(
1
k + s
− c+
)(
k + s
k
)
(n− 1)s
ns
Pk+s ≤ 0. (100)
Finally we obtain
m−k∑
s=0
(
1
k + s
− c+
)(
k + s
k
)(
n− 1
n
)s
Pk+s ≤ 0. (101)
Appendix IV
Proof of Lemma 17. To show feasibility, we need to prove that all m inequalities, given by Eq. (78),
are satisfied.
Step I. Let u ≤ v. Suppose that constraints (78) for k = u and k = v are equalities. Then, since
y2 = y3 = . . . = yn = yn+2 = 0, we have
u
(
n− 1
n
)u−1(1
u
− c+
)
y1 + ym+1 = a
u,
v
(
n− 1
n
)v−1(1
v
− c+
)
y1 + ym+1 = a
v.
(102)
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Suppose that
u =
1
c+
and v =
1
c+
+ 1. (103)
Then, after subtracting Eqs. (102), we obtain
y1 =
a1/c+ − a1/c++1
c+
(
n−1
n
)1/c+ ≥ 0. (104)
Further, we verify the remaining constraints:
k
(
n−1
n
)k−1 ( 1
k − c+
)
a1/c+(1− a)
c+
(
n−1
n
)1/c+ + a1/c+ ≥ ak (105)
Step II. Take k < 1c+ and set 0 < l =
1
c+
− k. Then k ( 1k − c+) = 1 − kc+ = lc+ and we may write
Eq. (105) as follows
l(1− a)(
n−1
n
)l+1 + 1 ≥ a−l. (106)
To justify that this is true, we carry out the following reasoning. First, note that
(1− a) ≤ 1
n
, (107)
which follows from the fact that the minimal biased probability always is lower than the
uniform one. Hence, we obtain
a−l ≤
(
n− 1
n
)−(l+1)
. (108)
Now, it is enough to prove that
l(1− a)a−l + 1 ≥ a−l, (109)
since it implies Eq. (106), due to Eq. (108). Let us write Eq. (109) as follows
l(1− a) + al − 1 ≥ 0. (110)
We have
d
dl
(
l(1− a) + al − 1
)
= (1− a) + al ln(a), (111)
where ln is the natural logarithm. Note that, since ln(a) < 0, we have
(1− a) + al ln(a) ≥ (1− a) + a ln(a). (112)
Let us verify if
(1− a) + a ln(a) ≥ 0, (113)
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which is equivalent to
e
1−a
a ≥ e− ln(a) = 1
a
. (114)
Using the Maclaurin series expansion, we obtain
1 +
1− a
a
+
1
2!
(
1− a
a
)2
+
1
3!
(
1− a
a
)3
+ . . . ≥ 1
a
(115)
which is obviously true. Hence, the value of first derivative is positive for every natural l,
which means that the function on the left hand side of (110) is monotonically increasing. As
a consequence, it is also non-negative, since for l = 1 it is equal to zero. This completes the
verification of the constraints for k < 1c+ .
Step III. Now, let k > 1c+ + 1. Set l˜ + 1 = k − 1c+ > 0. Analogously to the previous case, we may
rewrite Eq. (105) in the following form
1− al˜+1 − (1− a)(l˜ + 1)
(
n− 1
n
)l˜
≥ 0. (116)
Due to Eq. (107), we obtain
al˜ ≥
(
n− 1
n
)l˜
, (117)
which implies that to prove Eq. (116), it is enough to show that
1− al˜+1 − (1− a)(l˜ + 1)al˜ ≥ 0. (118)
We obtain
d
dl˜
(
1− al˜+1 − (1− a)(l˜ + 1)al˜
)
= −al˜+1 ln(a)− (1− a)al˜ − (1− a)(l˜ + 1)al˜ ln(a)
≥ al˜ (−a ln(a)− (1− a)− 2(1− a) ln(a)) .
(119)
The derivative is positive, i.e.
−a ln(a)− (1− a)− 2(1− a) ln(a) ≥ 0 (120)
if
ln
(
1
a
)
≥ 1− a
2− a. (121)
Note that it is enough to verify that
1
a
≥ e1−a (122)
and this is easily verified by the series expansions of 11−x and expx. Since, we established
positivity of the first derivative for every natural l, we know that the function on the left
hand side of Eq. (118) is increasing. As a consequence, the function is also non-negative,
which follows from the result for l = 1, namely that 1− a2 − 2(1− a)a = (1− a)2 ≥ 0.
